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Abstract 
 
In  this  paper  the  relation  between  ownership  structure,  board  composition  and  firm 
performance is explored. A panel of Swedish listed firms is used to investigate how board 
composition affects firm performance. Board heterogeneity is measured as board size, age 
and gender diversity. The results show that Swedish board of directors have become more 
diversified in terms of gender. Also, fewer firms have the CEO on the board which can be 
interpreted as a sign of increased independency. The regression analysis shows that gender 
diversity has a small but negative effect on investment performance, and the same holds for 
CEO being on the board. The analysis also show that board size has a significant negative 
effect on investment performance. When incorporating all the explanatory variables into one 
equation however, the negative effect of larger boards dilutes the effect of gender diversity 
and having the CEO on the board.  
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1.  Introduction 
A large body of research has examined the link between board composition and firm 
performance.
1  The  majority  of  studies  investigate  how  board  structure  influence  firm 
performance, usually measured by Tobin’s q or some accounting measure of profitability 
such as ROA. There are a number of recent Nordic studies investigating board composition
2 
and  firm  performance,  see  for  example  Bøhren  and  Strøm,  (2005);  Smith  et  al.  (2006); 
Randøy  et  al.  (2006);  and  Rose,  (2007).  The  empirical  results  in  most  studies  generally 
support a negative relation between board size and firm performance. The results of other 
board  composition  factors  such  as  age,  gender  and  nationality  are  far  less  consistent.  In 
particular,  the  question  of  how  ownership  structure  influences  board  composition  and 
subsequently firms’ performance is largely unresolved since very little empirical research 
exist.  
This paper is a response to Randøy et al. (2006)’s call for further investigation and for 
the  use  of  alternative  methodologies
3 to  evaluate  performance.  Marginal  q  is  used  as  an 
alternative, and in fact more appropriate, measure of performance. Contrary to the commonly 
used market to book ratios measuring the average return on the firms’ investment, marginal q 
measures the return on the firm’s marginal investment relative to the firms’ cost of capital. 
This  paper  also  adds  to  the  literature  by  empirically  investigating  the  links  between 
ownership structure, board composition and firm performance.  
By  examining  a  comprehensive  panel  of  firms  listed  on  the  Stockholm  Stock 
Exchange  during  1999 2005  the  paper  also  adds  some  methodological  insights  to  the 
                                                 
1 See Carter et al. (2003); Hermalin and Weisbach (2003); John and Senbet (1998) for excellent reviews. 
2 Board structure refers both to the size and to the composition of boards.   
3 Most performance studies use Tobin’s market to book value as performance measure (see for example Dalton 
et al, (1998); Dalton et al, (1999); Hermalin and Weisbach, (2003) for an overview of performance measure 
used in studies on boards of directors). 3 
 
empirical  literature.  When  studying  ownership  structure  and  corporate  governance  issues 
such as board composition Sweden provides a particularly advantageous example. Empirical 
studies generally characterize Sweden as a small, open and export oriented economy with 
firms having a concentrated ownership structure typical to the continental European corporate 
governance model.  
Our key findings are that board size has a significant negative effect on investment 
performance. The results also show that gender diversity has a small but negative effect on 
investment  performance,  and  the  same  holds  for  having  the  CEO  on  the  board.  When 
incorporating all the explanatory variables into one equation however, the negative effect of 
larger boards reduce the effect of gender diversity and CEO on the board on firm investment 
performance. The descriptive statistics show that Swedish board of directors have become 
more diversified in terms of gender. Moreover, fewer firms have the CEO on the board, 
which can be interpreted as a sign of increased independency. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two continues with a discussion 
of  the  previous  theoretical  and  empirical  evidence  regarding  the  relationship  between 
ownership, board composition and firm performance. From this discussion the empirically 
testable  hypotheses  are  drawn.  Section  three  then  follows  with  a  description  of  the 
methodology  used  in  the  empirical  investigation.  A  description  of  the  data  used  and 
descriptive statistics are provided in section four. After the empirical analysis in section five, 






2.  Ownership Structure, Board Composition and Firm Performance 
Size and composition of boards usually differ to some extent between companies. Linck 
et  al,  (2007),  show  that  smaller  and  more  dependent
4 boards  are  more  frequent  in  firms 
characterized by “high growth opportunities; high R&D expenditures and high stock return 
volatility whereas large firms have larger and more independent boards” (p. 2). Coles et al, 
(2008)  support  the  results.  Raheja  (2005)  develops  a  model  of  determinants  of  board 
structure. According to the model verification costs of investments is a determining factor of 
board composition. Moreover, the model shows that the board of directors is larger when 
high levels of private benefits to insiders prevail, and larger boards are less effective than 
smaller boards. The theoretical literature is however inconclusive as to the consequences of 
board structure. For example, the net effect of board heterogeneity could be either negative or 
positive. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argues that research on board composition and firm 
performance  is  mainly  empirical  driven  because  of  a  lack  of  a  coherent  theoretical 
framework. 
  A number of studies make use of the agency theory and the resource based theory
5 
when  assessing  the  relation  between  board  composition  and  firm  performance  (see  for 
example Randøy et al, (2006); and Dalton et al, 1999). According to the agency theory the 
main task of the board of directors is to control and monitor the management, i.e. to align 
principal agent problems (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Hence, in order to perform optimally the 
board must have access to accurate information.  
 
                                                 
4 In Anglo Saxon firms dependent boards are characterized by having many insiders on the board i.e. directors 
closely related to the management of the firm.   
5 Randøy et al, (2006) provide the following description:  Resource dependency theory addresses how a board 
might facilitate access to valuable resources. The emphasis is on a firm’s ability to form links to secure access 
to critical resources, such as capital, customers, suppliers, or cooperative partners (page 5).  5 
 
2.1  Ownership and Board Structure  
Assuming  that  the  objective  of  the  firm  is  to  maximize  profit.  That  is,  the 
management is employed to act in the interest of the owners and invest the firm’s assets so 
that shareholder wealth is maximized. Two types of agency problems arise; first, agency 
problems  caused  by  separation  of  ownership  and  control  as  accounted  for  by  Berle  and 
Means,  (1932)  and  Jensen  and  Meckling,  (1976);  second,  agency  problems  between 
controlling and minority shareholders. The first type of agency problem is more severe in 
firms  having  dispersed  ownership  i.e.  firms  in  Anglo Saxon  countries.  The  ownership 
structure  in  Sweden  and  Continental Europe  is  characterized  by  concentrated  ownership, 
which makes them more vulnerable to a second type of agency problem, namely between 
controlling  and  minority  shareholders  (Villalonga  and  Amit,  2006).  These  firms  suffer 
potentially  from  a  dependency  problem  between  the  controlling  owner  and  the  board  of 
directors (Saito and Dutra, 2006).  
According to the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance
6 the managing director and 
the chairman of the board cannot be the same person. In most Swedish firms the managing 
director is the only director with a seat on the board. Hence, “insider directors” are directors 
associated with the controlling owner of the firm. One way for the board to become more 
independent is to appoint foreign directors. Foreign and institutional owners can also play a 
monitoring  role,  i.e.  by  reducing  the  ability  of  controlling  owners  to  entrench  the 
management (Bjuggren et al, 2007). Singh et al, (2000) and Bilimora and Wheeler, (2000) 
                                                 
6 The  Swedish  Code  of  Corporate  Governance  is  a  report  based  on  the  Swedish  Companies  Act 
(Aktiebolagslagen, 1975:1385). The code was implemented in 2005 and regulates the conduct of publicly traded 
firms in Sweden. For example companies traded on the Stockholm stock exchange (OMX) may only have one 
person from the senior management on the board; a majority of the board members that are elected at the annual 
shareholding meeting should be independent from the firm and at least two of these independent board members 




suggest a positive relationship between institutional owners and board diversity. Based on 
this discussion we thus formulate hypothesis one and two: 
 
  Hypothesis 1: The presence of a controlling owner reduces board heterogeneity  
  Hypothesis 2: Institutional and foreign owners increase board heterogeneity  
 
2.2  Board Size 
Jensen (1993) argues that there is a negative relationship between large boards of 
directors, (above seven or eight members), and firm performance. Boards that exceed this 
number are much more likely to be controlled by the CEO and function less effectively.  
A  number  of  empirical  studies  investigate  the  link  between  board  size  and  firm 
performance. For an excellent literature review see  Hermalin  and Weisbach, (2003). The 
empirical findings generally support the  argument about “oversized boards” put forth by 
Jensen, (1993). For example Yermack, (1996) reports a negative relation between board size 
and Tobin’s q. The study show that most firm value is lost when the board goes from small to 
medium sized. This result also seems to hold for Nordic firms, Randøy et al, (2006) for 
example, show that larger boards have a negative impact on firm performance. Based on the 
above reasoning we formulate hypothesis three:  
 
Hypothesis 3: Board size has a negative impact on performance 
 
2.3  Board Composition, Information Allocation and Decision Efficiency  
In order to perform optimally the boards of directors must have access to accurate 
information.  There  is  an  ongoing  discussion  (van  Ingley  and  van  der  Walt,  2001) in  the 7 
 
literature regarding which type of directors or composition of directors that is optimally in 
this  sense;  outside  directors  with  better  knowledge  about  the  surrounding  business 
environment and access to information from other firms (business partners and competitors) 
or inside directors with superior knowledge about the firm.  
Board heterogeneity is associated with a trade off between increased costs in terms of 
longer  decision  time  and  lower  external  costs.  That  is,  a  trade off  between  increased 
information  efficiency  associated  with  heterogeneous  boards  and  decision  efficiency 
associated  with  homogenous  boards.  Heterogeneous  boards  tend  to  be  better  informed 
regarding  issues  outside  the  firm  and  thereby  better  equipped  to  question  and  discuss 
corporate strategic decisions, whereas homogenous boards to a larger extent is based on trust, 
co operation, as well as shared experience and values (Tson Söderström, et al, 2003).  
According to the resource based view, the board of directors is an important strategic 
resource in order for the firm to get knowledge, contact with the elite of the business world, 
external sources of capital, new geographical and industrial markets and competitors. Thus, 
increased  diversification  among  board  members  is  positive  for  the  firm  and  its  financial 
performance (van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). Due to increased knowledge and access to 
outside  information  a  diversified  board  should  be  better  at  advising  and  counseling  the 
management than a more homogenous board. The resources based view tends to focus on 
advantages with board diversity in terms of having access to a larger informational network 
and does not address the costs of decreased efficiency with respect to decision making.  
Age  and  gender  diversity  among  board  members  are  other  important  factors 
measuring heterogeneity. Over the last years there has been an increase in board diversity in 
terms  of  gender  among  European  firms.  Norway,  Sweden  and  Finland  are  the  top  three 
countries in this respect (Grosvold et al, 2007). Bilimora and Wheeler (2000), report that 8 
 
female directors are often younger than their male colleagues, whereby appointing female 
directors would increase diversity both in terms of gender and age. The empirical results of 
gender diversity are however mixed. Bøhren and Strøm (2005) report a negative influence of 
gender  diversity  on  firm  performance  whereas  Smith  et  al,  (2006)  report  a  positive 
relationship between female representatives in the top management and firm performance in 
small Danish firms. The latter result is confirmed by Carter et al, (2004) in an investigation of 
U.S. based firms. Rose (2007), evaluates the impact of having women on boards of directors 
in  Danish  public  firms.  The  empirical  analysis  show  no  significant  relation  between  the 
presence of women and firm performance. One explanation, put forth by Rose (2007) is that, 
in order to be accepted, new “unconventional” members need to adopt the behavior of the 
more conventional board members and business leaders which removes any possible effects 
of women on the board. This non significant relation between gender diversity and board 
composition  is  confirmed  by  Randøy  et  al,  (2006).  The  discussion  above  results  in  the 
following hypothesis:  
   
  Hypothesis 4: There is no effect of board heterogeneity on firm investment 
performance  
 
3.  Method - Marginal q 
Marginal q (qm) is essentially a marginal version of Tobin’s q. Mueller and Reardon 
(1993), derive the marginal q with the insight that investments are valued continuously by the 
market as the discounted present value of the future cash flows created by the investments. 
Alternatively, marginal q can be derived from Tobin’s q, where Tobin’s average q, qa, is 9 
 
defined as the market value, Mt, divided by the replacement cost of the firm capital at time t, 
Kt: 
 
t a t t q K M , / =
               (1) 
 
This measures the average return on the capital over its cost of capital. A qa above one 
implies that the firm should invest further. However, for adjustments of the capital stock the 
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where –δ  is the depreciation rate. A firm’s market value in period t is expressed as: 
 
t t t t t M PV M M   δ + − + = − − 1 1            (3) 
 
where PVt is the present value of the cash flows that investments, It, in period t generate, and 
µt a standard error term. Investment is defined as:  I = After tax profits + Depreciation – 
Dividends +  Debt +  Equity + R&D + ADV, where  D and  E are funds raised using new 
debt and equity issues. The net present value rule stipulates that investment should be made 
up to the point where PVt = It. This implies that PVt/It = 1, which can be rewritten as PVt/It = 
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Equation (4) assumes efficient capital market in the sense that future cash flows are 
unbiased  estimates.  Hence,  as  t  grows  larger  1 − t t M    approaches  0.  See  Mueller  and 
Reardon,  (1993);  Gugler  and  Yurtoglu,  (2003)  for  more  details  on  the  derivation  and  
properties of marginal q.  
To  study  the  effects  of  management,  ownership  and  control  interaction  terms  are 
constructed with variables accounting for board size, gender diversity, average age and a 






from equation (4) with  the explanatory variable of interest. This generates the functional 



































1 ...         (5) 
 
where Z are the explanatory variables. 
The marginal q (qm) has a number of advantages. Above all a marginal performance 
measure  is  more  appropriate  than  an  average  Tobin’s  q,  when  testing  hypotheses  about 
managerial discretion, since average measures of performance confuse average and marginal 
returns. Secondly, qm has a straightforward interpretation. If managers invest in a project that 
yields a return that is less than the cost of capital, qm < 1. This means that managers are over 11 
 
investing. That is, the marginal investment has a return less than the cost of capital and the 
shareholders would have been better off if the firm had distributed these funds directly to 
them  instead.  For  the  firm  to  maximize  shareholder value,  qm  must  be  equal  to  one. 
Conversely, if qm > 1 managers are not making enough investments. This means that the 
marginal investment had a return in excess of the cost of capital and that the firm should have 
invested more. 
 
4.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
In the empirical analysis an unbalanced dataset covering 105 firms, traded on the 
Stockholm stock exchange during the time period 1999 2005, is used. The financial data is 
provided by the Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT Global database. Only non financial 
firms  with  reported  data  for  at  least  four  years  are  included  in  the  sample.  The  data  on 
investment and market values are not normally distributed. The Jarque Bera test indicates 
non normality, and scatter plots shows that this is caused by a few number of extreme values. 
To control for the effects of these outliers we follow Gugler et al, (2004) but we only remove 
the last percentile of the observations with respect to the difference in change in market value 
and investment intensity.  
The  data  on  ownership  structure  are  collected  from  the  Owners  and  Power  in 
Sweden’s Listed Companies by Sundin and Sundqvist (1999 2005). This database provides 
detailed ownership data for Swedish listed firms. Voting and equity shares are aggregated so 
that different types of closely connected owners such as families, mutual fund companies and 
foreign  owners  can  be  analysed.  Furthermore,  the  database  accounts  for  indirect 
shareholdings.  12 
 
The data on board composition are collected from Directors and Auditors in Sweden's 
Listed Companies by Sundin and Sundqvist. The database gives detailed information about 
all members of the board. Data on number of directors, female representation, CEO on the 
board and age structure are used in the regression analysis. Table 1 provides a description of 
the variables used. 
 
 
Table 1: Description of variables  
Variable  Description  
Financial Data 
Source: Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT Global 
Mt  Market value at the end of period t.  
Defined as the total value of outstanding shares plus total debt.  
(Compustat mnemonic item numbers: MKVAL + DT)  
It  Investment in period t.  
I= After tax profit + Depreciation – Dividends +  Debt +  Equity + R&D + ADV 
(Compustat mnemonic item numbers:  IB + DP – DVC +  DT + SSTK   PRSTKC + 
XRD + XSGA) 
Ownership data 
Source: Sundin and Sundqvist “Owners and Power in Sweden’s Listed Companies” 
Ownership concentration  Percentage of the outstanding votes (V1) and capital (C1) of largest owner.  
Institutional Ownership   Percentage of the outstanding votes held by mutual funds. (See Wiberg, (2008) for 
further discussion on institutional ownership).  
Foreign Ownership   Percentage of ownership held by foreign owners. This type of owner is mostly foreign 
institutional owners.  
Board Composition 
Source: Sundin and Sundqvist “Directors and Auditors in Sweden's Listed Companies” 
CEO on the board of 
directors 
Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is on the boards of directors zero 
otherwise. 
Board size      Number of board members  
Gender Diversity   Share of female board members  
Average Age   Average age of board members  
 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Swedish listed firms are characterized by a highly concentrated ownership structure. 
The largest owner controls, on average, 34 percent of the outstanding votes and 24 percent of 
the capital shares (see Table 2). Previous research by Bjuggren et al, 2007 shows that vote 
differentiated shares has a negative effect on investment performance. Around 60 percent of 
the sample firms have a vote differentiated share structure.  13 
 
Institutional and foreign ownership has increased over the last years. These types of 
owners  controlled,  on  average,  12  and  19  percent  of  the  outstanding  votes  respectively. 
Interesting to note is that the largest institutional and foreign owners, on average, have more 
cash flow rights than outstanding votes.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - Ownership Structure (%) 
   Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std. 
C1  24.03  21.10  74.50  1.00  14.95 
V1  34.22  30.40  89.50  2.90  20.09 
Fc  21.36  16.15  91.10  0.30  18.29 
Fv  19.41  11.80  91.10  0.00  19.15 
Ic  13.57  11.25  54.90  0.00  11.75 
Iv  10.78  7.9  67.60  0.00  10.49 
Excess vote  10.22  4.30  49.10   20.20  12.59 
Vote diff.   61.00  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.49 
N = 1013           
The variables are defined as following; V1 is the percentage of the outstanding votes, C1 is the percentage of capital of the largest owner, 
FV and FC are foreign ownership in terms of outstanding votes in terms of capital respectively, IV and IC is institutional ownership in terms 
of votes and capital, Excess votes denotes the difference between outstanding votes and capital with respect to the largest owner, and vote 
diff. is a dummy variable indicating if the company have a vote differentiated share structure 
 
The structure of a board of directors has changed considerably over the last five years 
(Table 3). The two most salient features are the increase in female directors and the decrease 
in  firms  having  the  CEO  on  the  board.  This  development  may  indicate  increased  board 
diversity and independence. Over the last 6 years the share of female directors has increased 
by almost 10 percent, from 4.14 to 14.14 percent. At the same time the share of firms with the 
CEO  on  the board  has  decreased by  30 percent  from  89 percent  to  59 percent  in  2005. 
Swedish board of directors consists of 7 8 members, and the average age of a board member 








Table 3: Board Structure - Development over time 
 




CEO member  
of the board (%) 
Gender Diversity 
(%) 
2000  7.96  54.39  89.00  4.00 
2001  7.70  52.75  81.00  6.00 
2002  7.49  52.71  78.00  7.00 
2003  7.44  53.31  73.00  7.00 
2004  7.52  53.55  66.00  11.00 
2005  7.44  53.52  59.00  14.00 
Total  7.56  53.31  73.00  9.00 
Note: a) The table shows average values for each year. b) Table A1 presents more detailed descriptive statistics (mean, median, max and 
min values and standard deviation) for each variable. Gender diversity denotes share of female board of directors.  
 
 
5.  Empirical Analysis 
The  empirical  analysis  is  divided  into  two  parts;  first  the  determinants  of  board 
structure  and  the  relationship  between  ownership  structure  and  board  composition  are 
investigated. Ownership structure is measured as ownership concentration with respect to the 
largest  owner  and  foreign  and  institutional  ownership.  The  second  step  is  to  analyse  the 
relationship between board structure and firms’ investment performance (Section 5.2). We 
use marginal q to estimate the effects of board structure on investment performance. Table 4 
summaries the hypothesis and expected effect on performance.  
 
Table 4: Hypothesis and Expected Effects 
 
 
Panel A: Ownership structure 
  Expected effects on boards: 
H1: Ownership concentration  Homogenous Boards 
H2: Institutional and Foreign Owner  Heterogeneous Boards 
  Expected effect on investment performance: 
H3: Board Size   Negative 
H4: Board Diversity   Ambiguous 15 
 
5.1 Determinants of Board Structure 
Gender and age diversity are used as measures of board heterogeneity. The panel data 
approach allows us to construct a fixed effect model that controls for both industry (two 
digit) and time effects. Model 1 3 (Table 5) test the effects of ownership on board size. 
Following  previous  studies  we  control  for  firm  profit  and  size  in  terms  of  sales.  The 
estimations show a positive and significant relationship between firm size (measured as sales) 
and board size, i.e. large firms have larger boards of directors, a result well in line with 
previous research. Link et al, (2007) for example,  reports that larger US based firms have on 
average  10 11  board  members  whereas  small  and  medium  sized  firms  have  7 8  board 
members. The size of the firm also have a positive and significant effect on the average age 
(Model 7 9). The effect on gender diversity is statistical insignificant. Similarly, profit does 
not have any statistical significant effect on any of the board variables. The result is robust 
across various model specifications.   
The results show that having the CEO on the board has a positive effect on the size of 
the  board,  and  the  average  age.  This  parameter  estimate  is  significant  across  all  model 
specifications.  
When the effect of ownership structure on board composition and size is tested, the 
effect of ownership concentration on board size is insignificant. Hence, it is not possible to 
confirm hypothesis 1, which states that the presence of a controlling owner should decrease 
board  heterogeneity.  Neither  institutional  nor  foreign  ownership  have  any  statistical 
significant  effect  on  board  composition.  Consequently,  we  cannot  reject  hypothesis  2. 
Foreign and institutional ownership however, are found to have a positive impact on board 
size. Another important determinant of board size is the size of the firm (measures as sales) 
i.e. larger firms have larger board of directors.  16 
 
 






































The estimated equation is: DVi,t= β0+ β1*Salesi,t+ β2*Profiti,t + β3*CEO i,t + β4*Owner i,t +εi, t. CEO is a dummy, taking the value one if the CEO is a member of the board and zero otherwise. The ownership 
variables are defined as following; V1 is the percentage of the outstanding votes, C1 is the percentage of capital of the largest owner, FV and FC are foreign ownership in terms of outstanding votes in terms 
of capital respectively, IV and IC is institutional ownership in terms of votes and capital. A fixed effect model controlling for industry and time effects is used. Industry dummies are defined on a two digit 
SIC level. All values are deflated and expressed in 2005 years price level. The last percentile of the sample with respect to the difference between change in market value and investment ratio is removed to 
control for the effects of outliers. *** indicates a significance level at the 1% level, ** indicates a significance level at the 5 % level, indicates a significance level at the 10 % level. t statistics are reported 




Board Size  Gender Diversity 
 
Average Age  
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 






















































V1  0.00 
(0.24) 
      0.00 
(0.15) 
      0.01 
(1.22) 
     
FV     0.01* 
(1.71) 
      0.00 
( 0.77) 
       0.01 
(1.14) 
  
IV        0.03*** 
(6.04) 
      0.00 
( 0.12) 
      0.02 
(1.56) 


















R-square  0.4200  0.4217  0.4417  0.3350  0.3355  0.3350  0.2466  0.2475  0.2464 


















N. of obs.  979  979  979  979  979  979  979  979  979 17 
 
5.2 Board Structure and Firm Investment Performance  
In the following section we estimate the effects of board size and composition on 
investment performance. Tobin’s q is one of the most common measures of firm performance. 
It has a number of drawbacks however that can be mitigated by the marginal q methodology. 
One  of  the  most  important  features  of  marginal  q  is  the  ability  to  measure  the  relative 
deviation from efficient investment levels without a priori specifying a firm specific cost of 
capital
7. 
Dalton et al, (1998, 1999), argue that size and the associated complexity of larger 
firms  could  distract  otherwise  clear  relationships  between  board  composition  and 
performance.  Hence,  sales  and  growth  in  sales  are  used  to  control  for  firm  size  when 
estimating Tobin’s q. With the marginal q methodology size is controlled for via the market 
value of the firm. Table 6 presents the results when marginal q is the dependent variable, and 
Table 7 presents the results using Tobin’s q as the dependent variable.  
The results for model M1 (Table 6) is consistent with previous research on marginal q 
for Sweden. The estimated marginal q for the sample firms is on average 0.87. Gugler, et al. 
(2004) estimate marginal q to be on average 0.65 for Swedish listed firms, in a multinational 
study of investment performance. Model M2 measures the effects of board size. The results 
reveal  that  there  is  a  strong  negative  relationship  between  board  size  and  investment 
performance. Both model M2 and M6 support hypothesis 3 which states that board size has a 
negative impact on firm performance. The result is again in line with previous research (see 
for example Yermack, (1996); Randøy et al, (2006); Bøhren and Strøm, 2005). Also the 
effect of size on Tobin’s q is negative and significant.   
 
                                                 
7 See e.g. Mueller and Reardon, (1993); Gugler and Yurtoglu, (2003) for further discussion and comparison 
between different performance measures 18 
 
Table 6:   FE Regressions on the relation between Board Composition and Firm 
Investment Performance – Marginal Q  




































Where zi denotes the explanatory variables. Board size equals the number of board of directors, gender is the share of female directors, age 
denotes average age of all board of directors and CEO is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the CEO is a member of the board and 
zero otherwise. A fixed effect model controlling for industry and time effects is used. Industry dummies are defined at two digit SIC level. 
All values are deflated and expressed in 2005 years price level. The last percentile of the sample with respect to the difference between 
change in market value and investment ratio is removed to control for the effects of outliers. *** indicates a significance level at the 1% 











Dependent Variable: (Mt – Mt-1) /Mt-1   
Model M1  Model M2  Model M3  Model M4  Model M5  Model M6 
 












(It/Mt-1)*boardsize     0.09*** 
( 4.73) 
       0.08*** 
( 4.20) 
(It/Mt-1)*gender       0.73* 
( 1.80) 
     0.14 
( 0.32) 
(It/Mt-1)*age          0.01 
( 1.20) 
   0.00 
( 0.45) 















(  2.11) 
R-square  0.48  0.4956  0.4855  0.4844  0.4852  0.4973 
F-value  F( 41,   944) =   
21.30 
F( 42,   943) 
=   21.80  
F( 42,   943) 
=   20.92 
F( 42,   943) 
=   20.84 
F( 42, 946) 
 = 20.95 
F( 45, 941) 
 = 20.38 
N. of obs.  986  986  986  986  986  986 




Table 7:   FE Regressions on the relation between Board Composition and Firm 
Investment Performance  - Tobin’s Q 
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q   
 
Model T1  Model T2  Model T3  Model T4  Model T5 
 




















Boardsize   .05*** 
( 2.71) 
       0.05** 
( 2.37) 
Gender     0.08 
( 0.23) 
    0.29 
(0.78) 
Average Age        0.01 
( 1.31) 
   0.01 
( 0.99) 














R-square  0.2972  0.2919  0.2930  0.2995  0.3044 
F-value  F( 43, 941)  
= 9.1 
F( 43, 941) =    
8.95 
F( 43,   941) 
=    9.00 
F( 43,   941) 
=    9.29 
F( 46,   938)  
=    8.87 
N. of obs.  985  985  985  985  985 
The estimated equation is eq (5): Tobin’s q= β0+ β1,i,t*Sales+ β2,i,tGrowthsales+ β3i,tB+εit 
 
Where zi denotes the explanatory variables. Board size equals the number of board of directors, gender is the share of female directors, age 
denotes average age of all board of directors and CEO is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the CEO is a member of the board and 
zero otherwise. A fixed effect model controlling for industry and time effects is used. Industry dummies are defined at two digit SIC level. 
All values are deflated and expressed in 2005 years price level. The last percentile of the sample with respect to the difference between 
change in market value and investment ratio is removed to control for the effects of outliers. *** indicates a significance level at the 1% 
level, ** indicates a significance level at the 5 % level, indicates a significance level at the 10 % level. t statistics are reported within 
brackets.  
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To test hypothesis 4, we incorporate board diversity, age and gender diversity, into the 
model. Model M3 shows that gender diversity has a negative and significant  effect on firm 
investment performance. The change in marginal q, from 0.87 to 0.84 is however negligible. 
Also,  the  effect  of  gender  diversity  loses  significance  in  the  model  including  all  board 
characteristics  (model  M6).  The  effect  of  gender  diversity  on  Tobin’s  q  is  insignificant 
(model T2 and T5; Table 7). Age diversity is found to have no significant effect on firm 
performance. This result is robust with respect to performance measure.  
  CEO as a member of the board of directors is negative and significant both in terms of 
marginal q and Tobin’s q. Marginal q decreases from 0.87 to 0.82 for these firms. The effect 
vanishes in the full model M6. Considering Tobin’s q, model T4 and T5 in Table 7 show that 
the negative and significant effect of the CEO on the board remain significant when more 
variables are included in the model.  
  We  have  also  checked  for  non linearity  among  the  explanatory  variables  (see 
appendix table A2 and A3). Only the variable board size in the marginal q model show a 
significant non linear behaviour.  
To sum up, the analysis shows that, independently of choice of performance measure, 
board size affect investment performance negatively. The  estimated coefficient of  gender 
diversity is negative and significant, although the economic impact on marginal q is small. 
Also,  the  effect  of  gender  diversity  loses  significance  when  estimating  the  full  model  of 
marginal q. The results are in line with Randøy et al, (2006) who show that board diversity 
only affect firm performance if diversity leads to larger boards.     21 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper examines the determinants of board structure as well as the effects of board 
heterogeneity  on  investment  performance.  Due  to  the  lack  of  a  coherent  theoretical 
framework the majority of the research on board of directors are empirically driven. This 
study  adds  to  this  literature  by  using  a  more  accurate  measure  of  firm  performance,  the 
marginal q. Unlike most other cross sectional studies, we use a panel data approach which 
covers 188 firms during the time period 1999 2005.  
  The descriptive statistics show that over the last five years there has been a sharp 
decrease in the number of firms having the CEO on the board of directors. This can be 
interpreted as increased independency of the board of directors. Furthermore, the share of 
female directors has, increased from 4 to 14 percent.  
The empirical analysis shows that ownership concentration does not affect board size 
or board composition. There is however, a positive relationship between institutional and 
foreign ownership and board size. Furthermore, having the CEO as a member of the board 
increases the size of the board as well as the gender diversity and average age.  
In line with previous research we find that board size has a strong and negative effect 
on firm performance. None of the other variables are significant in all specifications of the 
model. When estimated separately both having the CEO as a member of the board and gender 
diversity have negative impact on the firm’s investment performance. The estimate of gender 
diversity  is  significant  and  negative  when  estimated  separately  with  the  marginal  q 
methodology, however it is not robust to other specifications of the model or with respect to 
the Tobin’s q methodology.  
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Appendix  
 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics – Board of Directors  
   Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std.  
Board Size   7.56  7.00  13.00  3.00  2.14 
Average Age   53.31  53.79  105.64  38.25  4.42 
CEO member  
of the board (%) 
73.00  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.44 




Table A2:   FE Regressions on the relation between Board Composition and Firm 






















































Where zi denotes the explanatory variables. Board size equals the number of board of directors, gender is the share of female directors, age 
denotes average age of all board of directors and CEO is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the CEO is a member of the board and 
zero otherwise. A fixed effect model controlling for industry and time effects is used. Industry dummies are defined at two digit SIC level. 
All values are deflated and expressed in 2005 years price level. The last percentile of the sample with respect to the difference between 
change in market value and investment ratio is removed to control for the effects of outliers. *** indicates a significance level at the 1% 




Dependent Variable: (Mt – Mt-1) /Mt-1   
Model A1  Model A2  Model A3 






(It/Mt-1)*boardsize   0.32*** 
( 2.64) 
   
(It/Mt-1)*boardsize^2  0.015** 
(1.94) 
   
(It/Mt-1)*gender     1.19** 
( 2.22) 
 
(It/Mt-1)*gender^2     5.01 
(1.55) 
 
(It/Mt-1)*age       0.05 
( 1.26) 
(It/Mt-1)*age^2      0.00 
(1.06) 






R-square  0.50  0.49  0.49 
F-value  F( 43,   942) =   
21.44 
  F( 43,   942) 
=   21.38 
N. of obs.  986    986     26 
Table A3:   FE Regressions on the relation between Board Composition and Firm 
Investment Performance  - Tobin’s Q 
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q   
 
Model T1  Model T2  Model T3 












Boardsize   0.06 
( 0.56) 
   
Boardsize^2  0.00 
(0.10) 
   
Gender     0.28 
( 0.38) 
 
Gender^2    0.64 
(0.31) 
 
Age        0.04 
( 0.90) 
Age^2      0.00 
(0.67) 






R-square  0.30  0.29  0.26 
F-value  (44,490)=8.97  (44,490)=8.74  44,490)=8.8
0 
N. of obs.  985  985  985 
The estimated equation  is: Tobin’s q= β0+ β1,i,t*Sales+ β2,i,tGrowthsales+ β3i,tB+εit 
 
Where zi denotes the explanatory variables. Board size equals the number of board of directors, gender is the share of female directors, age 
denotes average age of all board of directors and CEO is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the CEO is a member of the board and 
zero otherwise. A fixed effect model controlling for industry and time effects is used. Industry dummies are defined at two digit SIC level. 
All values are deflated and expressed in 2005 years price level. The last percentile of the sample with respect to the difference between 
change in market value and investment ratio is removed to control for the effects of outliers. *** indicates a significance level at the 1% 
level, ** indicates a significance level at the 5 % level, indicates a significance level at the 10 % level. t statistics are reported within 
brackets.  
 
 
 